This book reassesses the links between contracts, co-operation, and economic competitiveness. It uses new theoretical research and case studies to show how the economic theory of contract is being reshaped by the role of institutions in promoting co-operation and trust.
This book reassesses the links between contracts, co-operation, and economic competitiveness. It uses new theoretical research and case studies to show how the economic theory of contract is being reshaped by the role of institutions in promoting co-operation and trust.
The economic theory of contract is being reshaped in ways which resonate with the findings of socio-legal contract scholars and of industrial economists and sociologists in the Marshallian tradition, who emphasise the 'embeddedness' of organizations within their social and cultural environment. Contractual co-operation is seen as depending on institutional factors which serve to enhance 'trust', and arrangements which in the past were criticized as the product ofcollusion are being reassessed as potentially efficient responses to market failure. An active debate has begun on how instruments of public policy can best be deployed to arriveat an effective balance between co-operation and competition. This affects both the competitiveness of private sector organizations and the success of deregulatory reforms in the public sphere. These issues are explored within four main areas: developments in private-sector contracting; contract and organization in the public sector; the economics of contract law; and competitiveness and competition policy.
Simon Deakin is a Lecturer, Faculty of Law, and Assistant Director, ESRC Centre of Business Research at University of Cambridge.
The economic theory of contract is being reshaped in ways which resonate with the findings of socio-legal contract scholars and of industrial economists and sociologists in the Marshallian tradition, who emphasise the 'embeddedness' of organizations within their social and cultural environment. Contractual co-operation is seen as depending on institutional factors which serve to enhance 'trust', and arrangements which in the past were criticized as the product of collusion are being reassessed as potentially efficient responses to market failure. An active debate has begun on how instruments of public policy can best be deployed to arrive at an effective balance between co-operation and competition. This affects both the competitiveness of private sector organizations and the success of deregulatory reforms in the public sphere. These issues are explored within four main areas: developments in private-sector contracting; contract and organization in the public sector; the economics of contract law; and competitiveness and competition policy.
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