The Failure of Public Finance Management in Afghanistan

This book offers a critical examination of Afghanistan’s public finance system, illustrating how political motives, rather than technical reforms, dictated the distribution of public funds. By employing a historical institutional approach and drawing on extensive fieldwork, the author reveals how centralized planning persisted despite numerous attempts at reform, shedding light on the complex dynamics that shaped Afghanistan’s state-building process. This insightful analysis is essential for anyone studying the intersection of politics, aid, and governance in conflict-affected states.

Scott Fritzen, President, Fulbright University, Vietnam.

Mohammad Qadam Shah’s The Failure of Public Finance Management in Afghanistan is essential reading for anyone interested in public finance reform under challenging conditions. This book offers a meticulously researched explanation why the reconstruction effort in Afghanistan from 2001 until 2021 ultimately failed to prevent the Taliban’s return to power. Qadam Shah’s book emphasizes that the main reasons for the failures of post-conflict reconstruction lie with timeless questions about public administration and the perils of centralized public administration. It is an impassioned and thoughtful call to devote more attention to getting public administration reform “right” to promote peace and prosperity in conflict-affected states.

Ilia Murtazashvili, Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, Associate Director, Center for Governance and Markets, Campbell Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, USA.

Mohammad Qadam Shah is Assistant Professor of Global Development at Seattle Pacific University, USA.