Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design

‘This superb Handbook is a milestone in the progress of market design. It’s a comprehensive analysis of designs, implementation, experimental testing, and bidding experience in auctions and similar markets for spectrum licenses. The authors achieved remarkable success in many auctions after the initial FCC auction began worldwide efforts to allocate licenses more efficiently via market mechanisms. The distinguished contributors report their solutions to difficult problems, the resulting performance, and remaining challenges.’ Robert Wilson, Adams Distinguished Professor of Management, Stanford University‘The papers in this volume highlight both the theoretical and the practical issues that arise in spectrum auctions. The book includes contributions from many of the world’s leading economists, game theorists, optimizers, and computer scientists. Anyone interested in the practical application of market design and resource allocation will find this text an important reference.’ Karla Hoffman, George Mason University, Virginia‘Bichler and Goeree, both important contributors to the field, have curated an exceptional Handbook, which will be an invaluable resource for researchers and practitioners working on the design of auctions and secondary exchanges for spectrum and other applications with complex interdependencies.’ Peter Bossaerts, Redmond Barry Distinguished Professor, University of Melbourne‘Spectrum auctions are a remarkable example of ‘technology transfer’ from research to practice, with beautiful theoretical ideas informing current auction designs that regularly generate tens of billions of dollars in revenue. Bichler and Goeree have masterfully assembled the ‘greatest hits’ of this literature, ranging from the early papers that laid the foundations to the latest developments on the 2016 FCC Incentive Auction.’ Tim Roughgarden, Stanford University‘This Handbook is the answer to my search for a truly wholistic view on auction designs and will be an extremely valuable resource for consultations with regulatory authorities as well as bid strategy preparations.’ Matthias Leonhard, DT Spectrum Projects, Deutsche Telekom

Martin Bichler is Professor of Informatics at the Technische Universität München (TUM), and a faculty member at the TUM School of Management. He is known for his academic work on market design, and he has acted as a consultant for private and public organizations including regulators, telecoms, and procurement organizations. Projects in which he is involved include the design of auctions for industrial procurement, logistics, advertising, fishery access rights, and spectrum sales. His research addresses algorithmic, game-theoretical, and behavioral questions and has appeared in leading journals in computer science, economics, operations research, and management science. He is currently Editor of Business and Information Systems Engineering and serves on the editorial boards of several academic journals.

Jacob Goeree is SHARP Professor and Director of the AGORA Center for Market Design at University of New South Wales, Sydney. He is a world-leading experimenter, theorist and market designer whose research has influenced the design of spectrum auctions and markets for pollution permits and fishing shares. Goeree was Research Fellow of the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and is Fellow of the Econometric Society and the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences. He served as President of the Economic Science Association and as Editor of Experimental Economics. He is an Associate Editor of the Journal of Economic Theory and Games and Economic Behavior.