Written in a crisp and approachable style, Games and Information uses simple modeling techniques and straightforward explanations to provide students with an understanding of game theory and information economics. * Written for introductory courses seeking a little rigor.
Written in a crisp and approachable style, Games and Information uses simple modeling techniques and straightforward explanations to provide students with an understanding of game theory and information economics. * Written for introductory courses seeking a little rigor.
Written in a crisp and approachable style, Games and Information uses simple modeling techniques and straightforward explanations to provide students with an understanding of game theory and information economics.
“"The book will be an indispensable tool for undergraduates stuying advanced microeconomics and of course considerable interest to graduates, lectures and researchers of game theory and information economics."Mathematical Reviews”
Praise for the 3rd edition
"Rasmusen’s Games and Information provides wonderful coverage of the basics of game theory and information economics. His consistent style of presenting the theoretical structures lucidly unifies his test’s wide and well-chosen range of applications. I wish that all my students could take a course based on this book, and envy them the opportunity."
Maxwell B. Stinchcombe, University of Texas at Austin
"This is a terrific book bringing together two strands in the recent literature on economic theory, namely game theory and the economics of asymmetric information. The style is brisk, the arguments are rigorous and it seems to be pitched at exactly the right level."
Partha Dasgupta, University of Cambridge
Eric Rasmusen is the Dan R. and Catherine M. Dalton Professor of Business Economics and Public Policy at Indiana University in Bloomington. In addition to Games and Information, he has edited Readings in Games and Information (Blackwell, 2001) and co-authored Measuring Judicial Independence: The Political Economy of Judging in Japan (2003).
What may be the most successful introductory game theory textbook ever written is now available in its fourth edition. Since it first published in 1989, successive editions have made its presentation ever more elegant, with incisive problem sets and applications.
Written in a crisp and approachable style, Games and Information, 4e uses simple modeling techniques and straightforward explanations to provide students with an understanding of game theory and information economics. The fourth edition brings this material completely up-to-date, adds new end-of-chapter problems and classroom games, and is accompanied by a comprehensive website, featuring problem solutions and teaching notes:
With its emphasis on applications of game theory and information economics to a vast array of disciplines, Games and Information, 4e provides an accessible first course for students in backgrounds as diverse as economics, business, mathematics, and political science.
What may be the most successful introductory game theory textbook ever written is now available in its fourth edition. Since it first published in 1989, successive editions have made its presentation ever more elegant, with incisive problem sets and applications. Written in a crisp and approachable style, Games and Information, 4e uses simple modeling techniques and straightforward explanations to provide students with an understanding of game theory and information economics. The fourth edition brings this material completely up-to-date, adds new end-of-chapter problems and classroom games, and is accompanied by a comprehensive website, featuring problem solutions and teaching notes: With its emphasis on applications of game theory and information economics to a vast array of disciplines, Games and Information, 4e provides an accessible first course for students in backgrounds as diverse as economics, business, mathematics, and political science.
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