Bob Hale presents a broadly Fregean approach to metaphysics, according to which ontology and modality are mutually dependent upon one another. He argues that facts about what kinds of things exist depend on facts about what is possible. Modal facts are fundamental, and have their basis in the essences of things--not in meanings or concepts.
Bob Hale presents a broadly Fregean approach to metaphysics, according to which ontology and modality are mutually dependent upon one another. He argues that facts about what kinds of things exist depend on facts about what is possible. Modal facts are fundamental, and have their basis in the essences of things--not in meanings or concepts.
Necessary Beings is concerned with two central areas of metaphysics: modality--the theory of necessity, possibility, and other related notions; and ontology--the general study of what kinds of entities there are. Bob Hale's overarching purpose is to develop and defend two quite general theses about what is required for the existence of entities of various kinds: that questions about what kinds of things there are cannot be properly understood or adequatelyanswered without recourse to considerations about possibility and necessity, and that, conversely, questions about the nature and basis of necessity and possibility cannot be satisfactorily tackled withoutdrawing on what might be called the methodology of ontology. Taken together, these two theses claim that ontology and modality are mutually dependent upon one another, neither more fundamental than the other. Hale defends a broadly Fregean approach to metaphysics, according to which ontological distinctions among different kinds of things (objects, properties, and relations) are to be drawn on the basis of prior distinctions between different logical types of expression.The claim that facts about what kinds of things exist depend upon facts about what is possible makes little sense unless one accepts that at least some modal facts are fundamental, and not reducible tofacts of some other, non-modal, sort. He argues that facts about what is absolutely necessary or possible have this character, and that they have their source or basis, not in meanings or concepts nor in facts about alternative 'worlds', but in the natures or essences of things.
“"...I would be utterly remiss not to express how much I admire his book, how much I enjoyed studying it, and how very much I learned from it; wrestling with its sophisticated and erudite arguments was a deeply rewarding experience for me...it is a scintillating read; arguments are laid out with remarkable clarity, style, and rigor; proposals are developed and defended in assiduous and sparkling detail; and nearly every page is marked by Hale's seemingly limitless philosophical energy and ingenuity. I cannot recommend the book highly enough; indeed I consider it required reading for anyone whose work extends at all into ontology, the philosophy of language, or the philosophy of logic and mathematics." - Philosophia Mathematica”
Bob Hale's distinguished record of research places him among the most important and influential contemporary analytic metaphysicians. In his deep, wide-ranging, yet highly readable book Necessary Beings, Hale draws upon, but substantially integrates and extends, a good deal of his past research to produce a sustained and richly textured essay on - as promised in the subtitle - ontology, modality, and the relations between them. Christopher Menzel, Philosophia Mathematica [T]he essentialist theory presented in this book constitutes a significant contribution to an exciting research project concerning the relations between modality and essence. In addition, of course, Hale's development of the essentialist theory is only one aspect of the book's important contribution to central and fundamental topics concerning the nature of modality. Penelope Mackie, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews It is very a thorough book and Hale covers a lot of ground. It contains not only new research but also useful summaries of Hales views and overviews of the various positions he opposes or develops. Thus it is not only of interest to experts in the field, but it can also serve as an introduction to the topic to readers with a general knowledge of logic and metaphysics.
Bob Hale has taught at the University of Lancaster, University of St Andrews, University of Glasgow, and University of Sheffield. He is an Emeritus Professor at the University of Sheffield, and his main research interests are in the foundations of mathematics, and philosophy of logic and language. From 1997 to 1999 he was a British Academy Research Reader, and he was elected Fellow of the Royal Society of Edinburgh in 2000. In 2002-3 he was President ofAristotelian Society, and from 2009 to 2011 was a Leverhulme Major Research Fellow. He is a member of the editorial board of Philosophia Mathematica, and is author of Abstract Objects (Blackwell, 1987), co-editorof Reading Putnam (with Peter Clark; Blackwell, 1994), the Blackwell Companion to Philosophy of Language (with Crispin Wright; Blackwell 1997), and Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology (with Aviv Hoffmann; OUP, 2010); and co-author of The Reason's Proper Study (with Crispin Wright; OUP, 2001).
Necessary Beings is concerned with two central areas of metaphysics: modality--the theory of necessity, possibility, and other related notions; and ontology--the general study of what kinds of entities there are. Bob Hale's overarching purpose is to develop and defend two quite general theses about what is required for the existence of entities of various kinds: that questions about what kinds of things there are cannot be properly understood or adequately answered without recourse to considerations about possibility and necessity, and that, conversely, questions about the nature and basis of necessity and possibility cannot be satisfactorily tackled without drawing on what might be called the methodology of ontology. Taken together, these two theses claim that ontology and modality are mutually dependent upon one another, neither more fundamental than the other. Hale defends a broadly Fregean approach to metaphysics, according to which ontological distinctions among different kinds of things (objects, properties, and relations) are to be drawn on the basis of prior distinctions between different logical types of expression. The claim that facts about what kinds of things exist depend upon facts about what is possible makes little sense unless one accepts that at least some modal facts are fundamental, and not reducible to facts of some other, non-modal, sort. He argues that facts about what is absolutely necessary or possible have this character, and that they have their source or basis, not in meanings or concepts nor in facts about alternative 'worlds', but in the natures or essences of things.
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