Originally published in 1996 by John Murray, London.
Originally published in 1996 by John Murray, London.
Foreword by Admiral Sir John Woodward. When published in hardcover in 1997, this book was praised for providing an engrossing education not only in naval strategy and tactics but in Victorian social attitudes and the influence of character on history. In juxtaposing an operational with a cultural theme, the author comes closer than any historian yet to explaining what was behind the often described operations of this famous 1916 battle at Jutland. Although the British fleet was victorious over the Germans, the cost in ships and men was high, and debates have raged within British naval circles ever since about why the Royal Navy was unable to take advantage of the situation. In this book Andrew Gordon focuses on what he calls a fault-line between two incompatible styles of tactical leadership within the Royal Navy and different understandings of the rules of the games.
"Gordon provides a convincing argument that leadership personalities, acceptance of risk, and how a force conceptualizes their next conflict -- and trains towards it -- can make or break the most formidable of forces." --War on the Rocks? "This is history at its very best: properly raising the questions that we most want to have answered . . . . For all its learning - technical, historical, cultural - this book is always clear, vivid, and insightful. In short, great reading." --StrategyPage
Andrew Gordon was the Class of '57 Distinguished Chair of Naval Heritage at the U.S. Naval Academy from 2007-09. He has a PhD in war studies and is the author of British Sea Power and Procurement between the Wars an acclaimed exploration of naval policy and administration in the 1920s and 1930s.
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