A genuinely novel approach to the concept of emotional integrity.
What does it mean for emotion to be well-constituted? This book seeks to show that the answer to such questions becomes clearer if we realise that for an emotion to be all it seems, it must be responsible as well as responsive to what it is about. It also demonstrates that there can be problems of a structural kind with the adequacy of emotions.
A genuinely novel approach to the concept of emotional integrity.
What does it mean for emotion to be well-constituted? This book seeks to show that the answer to such questions becomes clearer if we realise that for an emotion to be all it seems, it must be responsible as well as responsive to what it is about. It also demonstrates that there can be problems of a structural kind with the adequacy of emotions.
Sound Sentiments seeks to open a new path in the philosophy of emotion. The focus of most recent work on the philosophy of emotion has been on the nature of emotion, with some attention also to the relation of emotion to ethics. This book explores the idea that emotions admit of valuation, of degrees of adequacy. We cannot just decide what to think, or to desire, or to feel, as we can decide to act, and these attitudes are integral to emotions. Nonetheless,emotions can have normative characteristics that resemble virtues. Philosophers are familiar with the notion that emotions are valuational. But how well they serve that function determines the value theythemselves have. The book opens with an account of the theory of emotion, reflecting recent work on that, and considers the way in which emotions are valuational (with reference to the contributions of writers such as de Sousa, Gibbard, and McDowell). The worth of an emotional experience depends on the quality of the valuation it itself achieves. Most of the book is then devoted to a set of interconnected themes. Some of these concern properties that emotions can havewhich can variously enhance or detract from them: profundity, social leverage, narcissism, and sentimentality. Others are attitudes with characteristic emotional loadings, and sometimes motivations, thatraise similar questions: cynicism, ambivalence, and sophistication. David Pugmire's general approach is indirect and negative: to analyse emotional foibles, which tend to elude us as we succumb to them, and thereby to point to what soundness in emotion would be. He also elicits connections amongst these aspects of the emotional life. The most pervasive is the dimension of profundity, which opens the discussion: each of the subsequent problems amounts to a way in which emotion can be shallowand slight and so amount to less than it seems; and accordingly, each identifies a form of integrity in the emotions.
“"Sound Sentimentsincludes a convincing vindication of the notion of emotional depth. [...] It is subtle, original, invigoratingly opinionated, and [...] stylishly written. It is a fine contribution to the literature on the moral psychology of emotions, and deserves to be widely read. --NotreDame Philosophical Reviews”
There are surprisingly few notable philosophical discussions of the concept of depth and Pugmire's is one of the best. Tony Milligan, Metapsychology It is subtle, original, invigoratingly opinionated, and, as I hope my quotations have illustrated, stylishly written. It is a fine contribution to the literature on the moral psychology of emotions, and deserves to be widely read. Ronald de Sousa, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
David Pugmire is at Department of Philosophy, University of Southampton.
Sound Sentiments seeks to open a new path in the philosophy of emotion. The focus of most recent work on the philosophy of emotion has been on the nature of emotion, with some attention also to the relation of emotion to ethics. This book explores the idea that emotions admit of valuation, of degrees of adequacy. We cannot just decide what to think, or to desire, or to feel, as we can decide to act, and these attitudes are integral to emotions. Nonetheless, emotions can have normative characteristics that resemble virtues. Philosophers are familiar with the notion that emotions are valuational. But how well they serve that function determines the value they themselves have. The book opens with an account of the theory of emotion, reflecting recent work on that, and considers the way in which emotions are valuational (with reference to the contributions of writers such as de Sousa, Gibbard, and McDowell). The worth of an emotional experience depends on the quality of the valuation it itself achieves. Most of the book is then devoted to a set of interconnected themes. Some of these concern properties that emotions can have which can variously enhance or detract from them: profundity, social leverage, narcissism, and sentimentality. Others are attitudes with characteristic emotional loadings, and sometimes motivations, that raise similar questions: cynicism, ambivalence, and sophistication. David Pugmire's general approach is indirect and negative: to analyse emotional foibles, which tend to elude us as we succumb to them, and thereby to point to what soundness in emotion would be. He also elicits connections amongst these aspects of the emotional life. The most pervasive is the dimension of profundity, which opens the discussion: each of the subsequent problems amounts to a way in which emotion can be shallow and slight and so amount to less than it seems; and accordingly, each identifies a form of integrity in the emotions.
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